I have argued, in earlier posts, that there is a strange connection between entertainment and our ideas about knowledge. Specifically, people who grow up immersed in the imaginary worlds of entertainment seem to have a tendency to accept relativism, the idea that there can be different versions of the truth. It would be too much to claim that entertainment causes relativism, but there are some historical connections that suggest that relativism has developed hand-in-hand with the culture of entertainment.
Speaking of strange connections, here’s another one. For some people strong faith in science contributes to the acceptance of relativism. That is, officially, in our society, we believe the most certain source of knowledge is science (I say officially because privately many people, perhaps most people, in our society continue to believe that the most certain knowledge comes from sacred texts such as the Bible).
Although I agree enthusiastically with the official view—the most certain knowledge comes from rigorous application of the scientific method–I also take it as obvious that there are lots of questions that science cannot address. For example, science cannot tell us why the universe exists, the purpose of human life, or which color of Pez is the best.
However, some people are so enthusiastic about science that they extend their conviction that the scientific method is the most reliable source of knowledge to the conclusion that it is the only source of knowledge. According to this reasoning, in areas where we cannot establish scientific truth, there is no truth. Voila, extreme cultural relativism.
An example: Many people (intelligent and well educated though they may be) assert that the value of artistic endeavors is simply a matter of opinion, that (for example) one cannot pronounce one painting or piece of music better than another. According to this line of thought, no one can say that a portrait of a sad clown on black velvet is any better or worse than a Rembrandt, or that a Beethoven symphony is better than a Lady Gaga song. Since there is no scientific way of proving that the Rembrandt is better than the clown, it isn’t.
But in fact, there is plenty of evidence that the Rembrandt is a better painting than the clown: it is more complex, creative, original, skilled in its execution, etc. Now, of course, people can deny that, just as a majority of the American population denies the evidence that supports the theory of evolution. But, in both cases, the fact that people deny something has no bearing on the question of whether it is true. We call something true when the best evidence we have supports it, whether or not that evidence has been derived scientifically.
Another example: It is wrong to murder people and keep them in your freezer so that later you can eat them. However, this fact was not established by scientific investigation. Do you believe that because there is no scientific evidence that murder is wrong, then maybe it is OK? If so, you are confused and potentially dangerous. Extreme relativism starts off sounding liberal and tolerant, it ends up being morally incoherent.
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Greetings,
Honestly, I disagree with a lot in this post. I don’t see the connection with entertainment and relativism that you do. Not saying wrong, just don’t see it as primary. Mass communication and real-time communication systems that give one access to a multitude of diverse cultures and viewpoints, these affect one’s view of truth and diversity. Second, literateness. The ability to read and the mass publication of diverse books that don’t reflect one’s own views or what one was taught to believe as true, these too affect one’s view of truth and diversity. Entertainment as ‘storytelling’, as emotive, yes, these affect me emotionally and sometimes stimulate thought, but, they are background noise. Entertainment is done by actors. The doctors on general hospital are actors, not doctors. I wouldn’t go to them to get real medical advice. In short, entertainers entertain. They don’t get paid to think and I wouldn’t ask them for advice or what was true about anything other than the entertainment industry.
Science does not address morality or art. It is not meant to. Scientists don’t rank Picasso, Monet, or, Klimt. The comparisons to me are relative. I appreciate Rembrandt, but, I can’t afford one to hang on my wall. Between a ‘clown painter’ and Mr. Rembrandt what truth does one expect to find? Why do you want to rank them in some way? It seems altogether rational to say aesthetics isn’t about which one is better but which one does one like better. Am I incorrect, wrong, or, deficient as a human in some way if I like the clown piece more? Are you the one to judge? I prefer relativism here, especially as it lies in the realm of aesthetics.
Murder can’t be scientifically proved wrong. Morality is not a scientific question. If you were born into a cannibalistic tribe you’d be a cannibal. If you obeyed your tribal laws you’d be a ‘good’ cannibal. Does that mean you are a good person? If you developed an conscience alien to your tribal milieu and refused flesh, would that make you a bad person? Who has the absolutist scale of what’s right and wrong. Are you or me to be their judge? I can only act according to my conscience and I chose to be my own judge. My society can judge the legality of what I’ve done, but, it is not and will not be my conscience. Here again I prefer relativism as it requires me to judge my actions and not just obey some code.
Finally, I appreciate the post as it did motivate me to think. Nice job.
“But in fact, there is plenty of evidence that the Rembrandt is a better painting than the clown: it is more complex, creative, original, skilled in its execution, etc.”
But those are not facts, they are matters of taste, judgement, bias, opinion… but not facts. Your argument is false. Your evidence for ‘better’ is based on the perspective of the observer and you are actually saying in terms of art, one persons opinion is more right than another. Thus, those who like Rembrandt and Beethoven over Lady Gaga and velvet paintings are somehow more right. Sounds more like an argument for elitism than extreme cultural relativism.
Thanks for your thoughtful and engaging comments. My response: First, if I haven’t convinced you that entertainment and relativism are connected, I can’t blame you, I didn’t really make that argument here. A very short version of my argument on this can be found at the post I linked to, but really I need to sketch this reasoning out more completely. I will do that in a future post. For what it’s worth, I agree with your assertions here about literacy, etc. I’m certainly not saying entertainment is the sole source of relativism.
There’s a misapprehension that runs through your other comments that actually suggests we agree on something important. You say that moral or aesthetic judgments cannot be established scientifically, and I agree, in fact that’s exactly what I’m saying. But I am also saying that there are many things that can be established as true without that having been established scientifically.
In your final paragraph you are arguing for the importance of tolerance: if someone is raised in a different culture, with different morals, what right do we have to judge their actions? I agree that in some cases we want to be tolerant of beliefs and actions we think are wrong, but we can do that without saying “there is no truth in moral matters.” That statement is both wrong and dangerous, and I urge you to at least reflect carefully on your position here. You imply that we cannot judge the morality of the behavior of others, although it may be judged illegal. So was slavery morally OK in South Carolina in 1860, since it was legal?
You ask in your second paragraph if I am the one to judge the truth in aesthetic matters. Of course not, nor am I the one to judge in scientific matters. The evidence is the standard, not anyone’s personal views. And if someone likes music that the evidence suggests is not very good, more power to them. My IPOD is loaded with music that isn’t very good, but it’s what I like.
There is more I could respond to in your comment, but I’m out of time. My response to some other comments addresses some more of your concerns. Thanks for your input, like you say, it motivated me to think.
You express a point of view that is very popular, namely that there is a clear distinction between matters of fact and matters of judgment. I understand why you (and many others) take this position, but that doesn’t mean I agree. Do you believe that judgments are not involved in facts? It’s a fact, for example, that the sun is approximately 93 million miles from the earth. How do we know that? People made judgments about various kinds of evidence, there is no “judgment free” path to knowledge.
In fact, there is no clear and absolute dividing line between judgments and facts, facts are just well-established knowledge. Lots of aesthetic matters aren’t well established, they are just people’s preferences. In those cases, nobody’s opinion is more right than anyone else’s. But there are some aesthetic judgments that are in fact well established, but that doesn’t mean anybody has to let those judgments influence their preferences. It’s a free country, listen to Lady Gaga, as I noted in another comment, I listen to plenty of dumb music.
By the way, I didn’t say Rembrandt was better than sad clown, I said there was evidence of this. I’m not elitist, I’m willing to listen to an argument that the clown is better than the Rembrandt. Make the argument.
Now, you probably still don’t agree with me, after all you said that my argument is false. But just to be clear, how did you establish that my argument is false? Didn’t you read it and make a judgment about it? In other words, you are making a truth claim while saying that truth claims are impossible. You may want to rethink this.
Finally, although I think you are wrong, I appreciate your weighing in with a thoughtful and well-formulated comment.
‘But in fact, there is plenty of evidence…’ You state it is a fact that there is evidence… yet you provide none. ‘more complex, creative, original, skilled in its execution.’ is not evidence, it is only your opinion.
Ergo, you argument is false as it is not supported by evidence that is capable of being tested by experiment or observation. I did not make a truth claim while saying that truth claims are impossible. I made no judgement, you failed to provide actual evidence to support your point.
Hi,
I’ll try once again to clarify: my whole point is to say that there is evidence is not necessarily testable. You evidently disagree with this–that is, you think that only testable propositions qualify as evidence. Fair enough, I guess we just disagree on that. You close by saying you made no judgment, but in fact you have judged my argument false. How does that work? (By the way, is your judgment testable?).
These are tough and interesting questions, and I genuinely appreciate your willingness to engage in debate about them.
Greetings,
You did spark off a round of comments with this. Excellent job, I’d say.
“…there are many things that can be established as true without that having been established scientifically.” – Oh, I do agree. I just disagree with how easily the word ‘true’ gets thrown around in common usage. We rarely qualify what we mean by true. For most people, true means true. Truth and certainty have a difficult history in philosophy, science, and, psychology.
“In your final paragraph you are arguing for the importance of tolerance: if someone is raised in a different culture, with different morals, what right do we have to judge their actions? I agree that in some cases we want to be tolerant of beliefs and actions we think are wrong, but we can do that without saying “there is no truth in moral matters.” That statement is both wrong and dangerous, and I urge you to at least reflect carefully on your position here. You imply that we cannot judge the morality of the behavior of others, although it may be judged illegal. So was slavery morally OK in South Carolina in 1860, since it was legal?”
- Sorry to quote the whole paragraph, it’s just that you use the description of “wrong and dangerous” and that bothered me. I am not arguing for tolerance, in any way, shape, or, form. You are arguing that there occur “truths” in moral arguments. It implies that an objective standard exists somewhere. Where? Morality remains an abstraction and a judgement. Morality I locate in the subject, in his conscience. What I see as “dangerous” is the giving up of one’s conscience to the collective. The Germans following Hitler though they knew what they were doing in many instances went against their conscience. That, to me, as immoral.
Your case, was slavery ok because it was practiced in the South? Not from your perspective nor mine, here and now. We judge it with our conscience. I do not say “there is no truth in moral matters”. I do say we do not have an absolute-truth in moral matters. I don’t have access to the ‘scales of true-right and true-wrong’. No one does. We must judge for ourselves. We must weigh matters for ourselves. Finally, we must never give up the right to draw our own conclusions and surrender our conscience to the collective, the media, nor any other.
Your ‘slavery’ argument makes an emotional argument. You are judging it retrospectively from current, modern attitudes. You make a judgement here for yourself, from your perspective. You don’t have to abstain from judging it, but, you must be aware of how and why. You probably can’t convince me that if you had been born to a plantation back then you’d have freed your slaves and let yourself go broke. Again, I am not saying it was right. I do not condone it. However, I see it from here and now, not then and there.
To approach it differently, murder. Murder is wrong. When a cop shoots a man who’s about to shoot another, who is wrong then? In war, who is wrong? You seem to argue that an absolute scale of right and wrong exists. I do not see this scale of rightness. I know I have a conscience, that it pokes and prods me, advises me. I know that others pressure me to act in conformative ways and that I must judge for myself if I feel those actions are moral or not. What I argue for is that each of us must sharpen our perception of our own conscience, and, listen to it. I do not argue for tolerance. Societies have laws that govern social behavior that it will and will not tolerate. That doesn’t override my access to conscience. I’d like to think that in slavery times, or, in Nazi Germany, I’d have acted against what was accepted as right, as moral for then and there, and objected that it was in both cases against my conscience to participate in these injustices. That I felt them to be immoral and would act against them.
I do not argue for ‘moral relativism’ but for the development of conscience in the individual.
“You ask in your second paragraph if I am the one to judge the truth in aesthetic matters…” – My mistake. I meant more generally as in one can only judge one’s “taste” for oneself. Worded it poorly.
Thanks for considering my arguments and responding in detail. In fact, I would agree with much of what you say here—in order to understand why other people make the moral judgments they do, we would have to work very hard to understand as much as possible about their position, and if we don’t do that our judgments are likely simply to reflect our own prejudices. An area where we are still not on the same page, though: When I say that there are moral truths, I do not mean—as you evidently assume—that they exist somewhere outside of human life. Unless we want to enter the realm of religion (and I don’t) one cannot assert that any truths, whether scientific or moral, exist beyond human knowledge. In fact, it’s self-contradictory to make such a claim. “Objects accelerate toward the earth at 9.8 meters/second squared” and “Rembrandt is a great artist” and “murder is wrong” are all true, because they are all supported by extensive evidence. But there is no basis for saying that any of these statements are true outside of human knowledge, that’s incoherent. So really, I think that “true” is a very simple concept, one that virtually everyone knows and uses all the time. I don’t know whether you would agree with that or not. But once again, thanks for your contributions. (By the way, just to make sure this is clear, none of this is original with me, I’m simply echoing the views of any number of philosophers on this. While I’m citing philosophers, you might enjoy Charles Taylor’s little book “the ethics of authenticity” where he carefully works out some of the issues you are addressing in this comment)
Fascinating discussion. I’m thrilled to have caught wind of your blog via a FB friend. I was also thrilled to see mention of Charles Taylor in the last comment; his work has been at the forefront of much of my thought recently. Along the lines of some of the questions that he poses, the issue that remains unclear to me in your thinking is the “why” – specifically, that connected with morality. Certainly we don’t ask “why” the sun is 93 million miles away, at least not in the same sense, or “why” objects accelerate toward the earth at 9.8 m/s2, but it seems to me there is a special kind of “why” that rightly applies to moral valuations, one that must be answered (as Taylor argues, at least implicitly) because it underlies their very efficacy. Perhaps you can sense where this line of thinking leads me, but I don’t intend to bait delicate issues, only to satisfy my curiosity about how you would answer this type of question, especially after having read Taylor.
Greetings,
Aha, I think we are on the same page – just we disagree, perhaps, semantically. Yes, you are right to call me out on making an assumption. I was wrong in doing so. For some reason, I thought you were arguing from a theistic standpoint. To me it seems most who assert access to “moral truth” come from a theistic position. My apology for allowing that bias to cloud the discourse.
Where we disagree, I think, lies in the usage of ‘truth’ and ‘evidence’. I think we both argue as ‘moral people’, as person’s who seek to act in a conscientious way. Obviously you examine your actions and judgements and seek a ‘correctness’ in living a good life. I do too, as well. So, without terminology, we agree in our actions. We both judge murder as wrong, for example. We do seem to differ in the terminology we would use to describe our process. I can live with that.
-Thanks for the referral to Taylor, I am looking into him. I tend to be more up to date on ‘dead philosophers’ rather than living one’s. (From the reference to ‘authenticity’ I gather he is referring to Sartre or Heidegger. I am more familiar with Sartre. Heidegger’s involvement in National Socialism tends to put me off him, though, of late I have had more of a look at him. Gadamer was a student of his. Hated his involvement with the Nazi’s, but still examines his philosophy. I lean more towards Nietzsche’s attitude, if the man is rot so too his philosophy.)
Finally, your right. I disagree that truth is ‘simple’. I know what you mean, and am sympathetic to the position. I just dislike the common usage of the word ‘truth’, as if it were self-evident without any consideration. I don’t think truth just smacks us in the face and says, “Here I am. Look at me. I am true.” I agree ‘true’ only makes sense from the framework of human knowledge, from human reason and human discernment. That we must judge with both our mind and with our feelings, our conscience. Not all truth is based on evidence that can be touched. But, in the end, I feel that the word true implies that the issue is settled once and for all. That it assumes an objective position. If one qualifies it as in, “I find it true for me in my judgement that murder is wrong and can not be justified except in self-defense,” then it sounds right. It expresses my opinion, my judgement. It doesn’t classify itself as ‘the correct position’ unless one is referring to my position. That is all I really meant to argue, when I consider it more.
Again, thank you for the exchange of viewpoints and clarifications. I look forward to reading more of your posts and your work. I intend to look around more on your website as it is of interest to me.
I think this really points out what to me occurs as the problem at issue -
J. Greyson:
“Along the lines of some of the questions that he poses, the issue that remains unclear to me in your thinking is the “why” – specifically, that connected with morality. Certainly we don’t ask “why” the sun is 93 million miles away, at least not in the same sense, or “why” objects accelerate toward the earth at 9.8 m/s2, but it seems to me there is a special kind of “why” that rightly applies to moral valuations, one that must be answered (as Taylor argues, at least implicitly) because it underlies their very efficacy.”
The problem I think of as one of ‘range and domain’, used in the mathematical sense. What is the domain of the function and it’s range of values. Morality, as a study and a discipline, differs from physical science. Both ask ‘why’, both require ‘evidence’, both have conditions for ‘truth’ – yet, they vary in that physical sciences have substantial, material subjects to work with. Morality does not. The types of evidence differ from each other. The conditions for ‘true’ differ from one another. They strike me as somewhat incompatible in comparison.
I think the problem in discourses on morality and moral judgements run into problems when neither party has firmly established terminology in common. Both use a shared terminology, english words in common usage, but they don’t agree in their respective usage.
I also agree with J. Greyson on the “why” of morality, particularly in general. One’s answer to this illuminates any discussion of morality.
“Why be moral?” – to avoid social conflict? to get in heaven? obedience to the way you were raised? to fit in? to feel better, or superior to others? These answers occur and I feel they occur as bad reasons that actually reject morality as an expression of conscience. In my case, I ‘feel’ that I can live a life that gives satisfaction and worth if I follow a course of action that accords with my conscience. I ‘feel’ that I must live within the constraints of that conscience and not give in to impulsive actions. In this, the domain and range remains limitted to me alone. I do not qualify to act as judge of others morality, even though I will make judgements. Society will judge actions and attempt to judge motives, this is not morality but legality. To me, seperate domains.
Again, sorry to jump in on this. I had intended to stop with my last post but Greyson’s post raised what I thought was an important issue.
Well, now we’re really getting somewhere, great question. I can’t claim to speak for Taylor, and I myself am not a philosopher, but based on my reading of him I would answer your question as follows: There are realms of knowledge, such as aesthetics and morality, in which some judgments reflect mere preferences. This is why, in my original post, I mentioned Pez. If you prefer green and I red Pez, those are just our preferences, they are not matters of what Taylor sometimes calls “strong evaluation.” This is because there is really no weight of human knowledge involved in this dispute. If on the other hand one of us were to say “I prefer that our social institutions include slavery,” that’s not just a preference. The weight of human knowledge suggests that slavery is a cruel and unjust social institution; judging slavery is a strong evaluation. Therefore the preference for slavery is wrong.
Now, obviously I’ve picked extreme examples, there will be lots of questions where we might really have some trouble figuring out “is this just a preference?” or is this an area of strong evaluation? In order to figure it out we will have to talk about why we think that this may be an area of strong evaluation, and we will answer that “why” question by talking about evidence from the realms of science, values, culture, etc.
Hope that helps. Glad to have your input.
Hi Scott,
I don’t want to prolong this thread past the point of your interest, but I did want to make a couple of quick comments. First, I’m an old math guy myself, and I like the notion of domain and range here, I think you could do a lot with that. More broadly, even when we discover the truths of mathematics, they hold within the parameters of the system we have set up. 5 + 5=10 in our familiar base ten system; to say 5+5=10 is a universal truth extending beyond any numerical system is simple nonsense. This bears on your mention of “true once and for all.” Here I would say that we don’t have access to that level of certainty, all our truths must be considered revisable in the light of new evidence. Newtonian mechanics provided the truth until Einstein came along. Finally, why be moral, if one’s convictions are not based in religion? Because, as we have been struggling to establish, there are moral truths. You still seem to want to call these legalities, but as you point out this seems to be more a semantic issue than anything else. Good discussion, it’s been fun.
Hi (Again) Peter,
Ah, no worry. You can’t wear out my interest in this thread. I merely was worried it might be inappropriate to keep going on about this on your blog.
Like you, I think it’s really getting interesting at this point.
Legalities. To sharpen my point here, I agree that society has the right and the responsibility to communally set limits on ‘acceptable behavior’. The social sphere has limits of what it can and will tolerate. I do not classify these judgements as morality, or, moral truths. They lie in the domain of the “social discourse”. Personally, I prefer the social and the individual levels to remain seperate domains, in the sense that I determine my conscience and my actions. I am influenced by and influence the social realm, but, one does not determine the other. To me this is the reason ‘mob psychology’ gets so ‘ugly’. People will do things en mass they would never do singly. They become anonymous in the crowd and surrender their personal judgement and responsibility. Nazism as an extreme example of this, lynchings as another. Riots, not uncommon these days in the world, as another case. Your work on play, on entertainment, I think probably ties in to this very issue very well. Entertainment is a mass industry. It appeals to mobs of people, not individuals. It blurs the individual to appeal to as many as possible. The persons exposed to it are in turn affected by it. As they become more and more exposed they begin to imitate and emulate because they see it as the ‘mainstream’, the ‘weight of human knowledge’ must be with it because everybody likes it. Entertainment and play are to me forces of homogenization – even the heterogeneous productions and activities.
That is why I place morality on the shoulders of the individual. One must hold oneself to account for ones actions. The social can set limits on behavior, but, morality remains in the domain of the subject, the individual.
Your response to Greyson really does clarify much. It speaks of “the weight of human knowledge” and “strong evaluation”. Also, your discussion of ‘why’ as very illuminating. In your response to me you mention limits on our access to the level of certainty I wholly agree.
Thank you.
Hi again,
It’s interesting that you discuss “mob psychology” because a concern with similar phenomena underlies my argument in Caught in Play. In other words, I think your questions are similar to mine, although you are coming at them from a different angle. The title “Caught in Play” refers to experiences of immersion in entertainment, and I think one thing that produces these mental states is the same sort of emotional contagion that occurs in an excited group. We “catch” emotions from actors on a screen, just as we can “catch” them from other persons who surround us. One could ask, then, whether entertainment sometimes functions as a mob can—whether it influences people’s emotions in ways that may direct their behavior, even so much so that they do things that they would normally reject as immoral. That’s my question, I don’t have the answer. (but see my posts on “shadow values” if you’re interested)
I think that in order to further advance this discussion I’m going to need to address your original criticism, which is that I need to clarify the relationships between entertainment and relativism. As I noted, I intend to do this, although I’ll probably have to wait until next year. For my blog at Psychology Today I want to write some stuff appropriate to the season, that seems to be what a lot of folks want to read about now. (maybe I can connect relativism and Santa…doubtful, I admit)